This paper proposes a model of multilateral contracting where players are engaged in two parallel interactions: they dynamically form coalitions and play a repeated normal form game with temporary and permanent decisions. We show that when outside options are independent of the actions of other players all Markov perfect equilibrium without coordination failures are efficient, regardless of externalities created by interim actions. Otherwise, in the presence of externalities on outside options, all Markov perfect equilibrium may be inefficient. This formulation encompasses many economic models, and we analyze the distribution of coalitional gains and the dynamics of coalition formation in four illustrative applications.
Introduction
Following Rubinstein [18] 's study of two-player alternative offers bargaining, a number of models have been proposed to explain the formation of coalitions and multilateral agreements. These models typically rest on two polar assumptions on the exit decisions of players. Either coalitions are forced to leave the game after they are formed, or players continuously renegotiate multilateral agreements. In the first strand of the literature [1, 2, 12, 13, 16] , the outcome of the bargaining process may be inefficient, as players choose to form smaller are immune to coordination failures, by imposing that players remain in the game with a probability greater than ε > 0. In games with pure outside options, we show that as players become perfectly patient, equilibria without coordination failure exist and are efficient, as long as all players have opportunities to make offers. The intuition underlying these results is easily grasped. Early exit results in an aggregate efficiency loss. In a game with pure outside options, players are able to capture this inefficiency loss and will never choose to leave before the grand coalition is formed. By staying in the game one more period, a player is guaranteed to obtain her outside option (which remains available because outside options are pure), and is able to capture the inefficiency loss by proposing to form the grand coalition when she is recognized to make an offer. Hence, early exit will never occur in equilibrium.
The previous result depends crucially on the fact that outside options are independent of the actions of the other players. We provide an example to show that, in games with externalities on outside options, all equilibrium outcomes may lead to the inefficient formation of partial coalitions. The three-player example we construct displays the following features: (i) once a two-player coalition has formed, players obtain a large payoff when they are the only ones exiting the game, and the unique equilibrium of the simultaneous action game is completely mixed, so that exit occurs with a positive probability, and (ii) at the initial stage where all players are singletons, players have an incentive to form a two-player coalition, as a partial agreement results in a large asymmetry between the two-player coalition and the remaining singleton. When both features are present (incentives to exit alone and large payoff to partial agreements), in all equilibria, players initially choose to form a two-player coalition, and to exit the game with a positive probability. These equilibria are obviously inefficient, as players exit before extracting all gains from cooperation.
In the second part of the paper, we dwelve deeper in the structure of equilibrium outcomes, by considering four illustrative applications of the model. The first application is an extension of two-player games with outside options to a multilateral context. We show that the equilibrium (without coordination failures) of the multilateral game reflects the "outside option principle'': either outside options are binding and the player with the largest outside option receives her outside option, or they are not binding and the outcome of bargaining is unaffected by outside options. However, when outside options are binding, the equilibrium exhibits a novel property: the equilibrium payoff of all players depend on the entire vector of outside options. In our second application, we analyze the principal-agent models with externalities proposed by Segal [19] , where a single principal contracts with several agents, and the contract imposes externalities on non-trading agents. We focus on the dynamics of coalition formation in a model with symmetric agents, and show that when trading between the principal and agents induces positive externalities on other agents, the principal and agents contracts to form the grand coalition in one step. When trading induces negative externalities, the grand coalition is formed in two steps. The principal first chooses to contract with a subset of agents in order to reduce the outside opportunities of the remaining agents.
The last two applications consider games where the payoff of exiting players depends on the actions chosen by remaining players. We first consider a three-player pure public good game, similar to the game studied by Ray and Vohra [17] . Countries negotiate over the reduction of pollution levels, and partial contracts result in positive externalities on the other countries. We show that the grand coalition does form in equilibrium. Depending on the value of partial agreements, a global agreement is either reached immediately or in two steps. Finally, we discuss a model of market entry with synergies, where firms may mergeand benefit from synergies-before entering the market. In this model, the merger of two firms induces negative externalities on the remaining firms. Assuming that the market can only support one firm, we exhibit a range of parameter values for which the game results in the inefficient formation of a partial agreement.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 contains preliminary results on characterization and existence of equilibria. In Section 4, we discuss efficiency of the bargaining outcomes, establish our main results and discuss the relation to the previous literature-notably Seidmann and Winter [20] . Section 5 discusses our four illustrative applications, and Section 6 concludes.
The model
We model the formation of coalitions among N = {1, 2, . . . , n} agents and bargaining as an infinite horizon game, with two distinct phases at every period. Any period starts with a contracting phase, where a player is chosen at random to propose forming a coalition (a nonempty subset of N). Coalitions once formed become the decision makers (the players). The set of players after contracting is denoted by N , which is a coalition structure or a partition of the set N into disjoint coalitions (typical players in N are represented by labels i, j). In the next phase, the action phase, each existing coalition i ∈ N chooses simultaneously an action a i from a finite action set A i = E i ∪ R i , which may be a permanent action E i (in which case the coalition exits the game and thereafter chooses the same action in all future periods) or a temporary action R i (E i ∩R i = ∅). In many applications, the two sets only consist of one element: a single action r ∈ R i interpreted as "remaining in the game'', and a single action, e ∈ E i , interpreted as "exiting the game''. The action profile determines a flow payoff for all the players, representing the underlying economic opportunities. 3 The interplay between the contracting and action phases enables us to consider simultaneously issues of coalition formation, externalities and endogenous exit decisions.
Subgames are described by a state variable s = (N , E, e) where i ∈ N are the current coalitions/players, E ⊂ N denotes the coalitions who have exited, and e = (e i ) i∈E are their exit actions. The players in N \E are "active'' players (being able to form coalitions and choose actions) while players in E are "inactive" with actions fixed and not being able to form new coalitions. Hence, we interpret a permanent action as an irreversible investment made by the player, which is not subject to renegotiation. Time is discrete and runs as t = 1, 2, . . . , ∞, and in each period there is:
Contracting phase: Say that the state is s = (N , E, e). One of the active players i ∈ N \E is chosen at random to make an offer. The probability with which player i is chosen to make an offer, q i (s), is exogenously given and may depend on the state. An offer is a pair (S, t), where S is a subset of active players N \E and t a vector of transfers satisfying j ∈S t j = 0. We interpret the transfer t j as the net present value of a flow of payments, by which player i obtains control over the resources of player j. When player i has obtained control over the resources of all the players in S, we identify the player with the new coalition. 4 A fixed protocol determines the order in which players in S\i respond to the offer. At the end of the contracting phase, the state changes to s c = (N c , E, e), if all of them accept the offer, where N c = (N \S) ∪ {∪ j ∈S j }, or, if one of the prospective members of S rejects the offer, no trade takes place and s c = s.
Action phase: At the action phase starting with arbitrary state s = (N , E, e), all active players simultaneously choose an action a i from the action set A i . At the end of the action phase, the state changes to s a = (N , E a , e a ) , where E a = {i ∈ N : a i ∈ E i } and e a = (a i ) i∈E a .
Flow payoffs are collected by all the players at the end of the action phase. If the action profile is a, flow payoffs accrue to all players in N according to utility functions v i (a), for all a ∈ × i∈N A i and i ∈ N . (Note that payoff functions are defined, for every coalition, in all coalition structures, and any action (permanent or temporary) taken by them. The payoff flow (or single-period payoff) is 1 − v i (a) with present value v i (a), where ∈ (0, 1) is the common discount rate of all players. When the grand coalition forms, we let V denote the total payoff of the grand coalition, and assume that the grand coalition is efficient, i.e. for any state different from the grand coalition V > i∈N v i (a) for any action profile a.
We restrict our attention to Markovian strategies. Hence, at the contracting phase, a proposer's strategy only depends on the current state s, a respondent's strategy only depends on the current state s, the current offer she receives and the responses of preceding players. At the action phase, strategies only depend on the current state s. A Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) is a Markovian strategy profile, where every player acts optimally at every contracting phase of the game, and all players play a Nash equilibrium at every action phase.
For a given Markovian strategy, let 1 i (s) denote the continuation value of the game for player i at the contracting phase at state s (before the choice of proposer), and 2 i (s) denote the continuation value of player i at the action phase of state s. Finally, we denote by i = 1 i (s 0 ) the value of the game for player i at the initial contracting stage s 0 , when no coalition has formed.
Characterization and existence
We now provide a complete characterization of equilibrium. At any state s, we first compute the mixed strategy equilibria at the action phase, taking continuation values (.) . Therefore, at the action stage, the continuation value is obtained as the equilibrium payoff of a strategic game played by the active players. At the contracting stage, the continuation value is obtained as an expected value, considering three possible situations. With probability q i (s), player i is called to make an offer, and proposes to form any optimal coalition S, obtaining a value 2 S (s c ) − j =i,j ∈S 2 j (s). With probability q j (s), another player j is recognized to make an offer, and proposes a coalition S. Either player i belongs to coalition S, and she receives the offer 2 i (s), or otherwise she receives her continuation value 2 j (s c ) at the action phase (for details see Lemma A.1 in the appendix).
We now prove the existence Markov perfect equilibrium, using Kakutani's fixed point theorem.
Proposition 1. The coalitional bargaining game admits a Markov perfect equilibrium.
The characterization results of this section will be used to construct Markov perfect equilibria in the examples and applications of the next sections.
Efficiency
We start the analysis of the coalitional bargaining game by considering games with pure outside options, where a player's payoff after exit is independent of the actions of the other players. Formally: Definition 1. The underlying game v is a game with pure outside options if and only if players' exit payoffs are independent of the actions and coalition structures chosen by the remaining players i.e. for all c.s. N , N such that i ∈ N and i ∈ N , and all e i ∈ E i , a −i = (a j ) j ∈N \i and a −i ∈ (a j ) j ∈N \i , the payoffs v i (a −i , e i ) = v i (a −i , e i ) are equal.
The class of games with pure outside option naturally includes games in coalitional form, where exiting coalition/players receive their coalitional worth. But it also encompasses a wider range of situations. For example, the condition above does not put any restriction on the interim payoff received by players in the course of negotiations (the inside options). Furthermore, in games with pure outside options, the payoff of active players may depend on the exit choice of other players. This is the case, for example, in our second illustrative application, where a principal contracts with a set of agents, and agents' payoffs depend on the exit decision of the principal.
We show that games with pure outside options always admit Markov perfect equilibria where contracting results in an approximately Pareto efficient outcome. Formally, we show that for any > 0, i > V − for all ( ), where we recall that i is player i value at the beginning of the game. We also show that when externalities on players' exit payoffs are negligible, the coalitional bargaining procedure results in approximately efficient contracting outcomes.
Conversely, in games where players' outside options depend on the behavior of other players, all Markov perfect equilibria may be inefficient (i.e., there exists a > 0 such that i < V − in all equilibria and for all ( )). We exhibit a three-player game where, in all equilibria, there exists an action stage where the probability of players exiting is bounded away from zero and, at the initial contracting stage, players have an incentive to reach the action stage where exit occurs with positive probability. We thus note that the critical element for the existence of efficient equilibria is the presence of externalities on outside options. Inside options affect the interim payoffs of the players, and hence the dynamics of coalition formation and the distribution of gains from cooperation, but play no role in the theorem and examples of this Section.
Efficiency in games with pure outside options
Inefficient outcomes arise in the bargaining game when players exit before the formation of the grand coalition. 5 At the action phase, as players' exit choices are simultaneous, coordination failures may lead to inefficient equilibria. Consider the following simple twoplayer example. and the total value of coalition {12} is V > 2a. 5 As we consider situations where players' discount factors converge to 1, inefficiencies due to delay in the formation of the grand coalition become negligible.
Let
1 denote the common continuation value (at a symmetric equilibrium) of both players at the initial state. In the action phase, the game played by the two players has a payoff matrix given by r e r ( 1 , , a) (a, a) It is easy to see that this game admits an inefficient pure strategy equilibrium where both players simultaneously exit. Notice that this is not the only equilibrium of the game for high values of the discount factor . If > 2a/V , the game also admits an efficient symmetric pure strategic equilibrium where both players remain, and 1 = V /2. Example 1 illustrates in the simplest way the fact that coordination failures are unavoidable in a model where exit decisions are simultaneous. However, when the discount factor is high enough, the game also admits efficient equilibria where both players remain in the game with positive probability. Coordination failures at the action phase can easily result in inefficient equilibria at the contracting phase as well. 6 Hence, in our search for efficient outcomes, we focus on equilibria without coordination failures at the action phase. We define an ε-R strategy profile as one where all players put a probability at least equal to ε of remaining in the game at every action stage. Formally, we define: Definition 2. For any ε ∈ (0, 1), an ε-R strategy profile is a strategy profile where all players play a temporary action with probability at least equal to ε at any action phase, i.e. The class of ε-R equilibria defines a refinement of Markov perfect equilibria. This refinement is of interest because we show in Proposition 2 that when the discount factor is high enough, ε-R equilibria always exist in games with pure outside options. Moreover, in Proposition 3 we establish that all ε-R equilibria are Pareto efficient in games with pure outside options. 7 Thus ε-R equilibria defines a non-empty class of efficient equilibria which is immune to coordination failures. 8 6 To see this, add a third player to the game of Example 1, and suppose that a coalition of two players obtains a payoff W when it exits, with W > 3a, V > W + a and W > 3V /4. In this game, for max{3a/W, 3(V − W )/W }, there exists an equilibrium where (i) players initially contract to form a two player coalition, (ii) after a two player coalition is formed, all players simultaneously exit, and (iii) at the initial action phase when all three players are present, all players remain in the game. This equilibrium results in the formation of the inefficient two-player coalition. 7 There may not be ε-R equilibria, even for pure outside option games, for low values of the discount factor.
For example, the game analyzed in Example 1 does not admit any ε-R equilibrium for low values of . 8 Preplay communication may be another reason for players avoiding coordination failures. Cooper et al. [3] find that preplay communication can be quite effective in overcoming coordination failures. Proposition 2 is a key result of our analysis. The intuition underlying the result follows. Consider the constrained coalitional bargaining game where all players are required to play ε-R strategies. By standard arguments, this game admits a Markov perfect equilibrium. We show that any equilibrium of the ε-constrained game is also an equilibrium of the original (unconstrained) coalitional bargaining game. Suppose by contradiction that the constraint were binding for one player. Exiting would then be a strict best response at some action phase, and the game would end up with early exit with probability at least 1 − ε > 0. This results in an aggregate inefficiency for all the players. However, if the exiting player had instead chosen to stay, her short-term losses would be negligible (as is close to one), and her payoff in the next period would be strictly greater than her outside option. This last statement is true for two reasons. On the one hand, if the player were not chosen to propose next period, she would always be able to get her outside option (we use here the assumption that outside options are pure, so a player cannot be prevented from getting the same outside option next period). On the other hand, if the player were to propose in the next contracting phase, she would be able to extract some of the aggregate efficiency loss, making her payoff strictly greater than her outside option. Hence remaining in the game must be a better response than exiting at the action phase, and any equilibrium of the ε-constrained game is also an equilibrium of the original game.
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Note that this result depends crucially on the fact that outside options are pure. In games where outside options depend on the actions of the other players, a player may not be able to get the same payoff if she exits later in the game. Hence, as we will see in the example below, Proposition 2 does not extend to games where players' payoff upon exit depends on the behavior of other players.
Interestingly, taking ε converging to 1, Proposition 2 shows that, as converges to one, the bargaining game admits a Markov perfect equilibrium where the probability of exit at any action phase converges to zero. In fact, this result can be strengthened, as we can show that, as converges to 1, in all ε-R equilibria, the probability of exit of all the players at any action phase converges to zero. Furthermore, as the probability of remaining in the negotiations converges to one, the grand coalition will ultimately be formed in equilibrium, and the bargaining procedure results in an efficient outcome.
Proposition 3. For any game with pure outside options, as converges to one, the probability of exit in all ε-R Markov perfect equilibrium converges to zero for all the players at all states, and the equilibrium outcome converges to an efficient outcome (i.e., for any
Propositions 2 and 3 thus show that, for games with pure outside options, as converges to 1, there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium resulting in an efficient outcome. We now show that these results are robust to the introduction of small external effects. When outside options are approximately pure, we can still show that ε-R Markov perfect equilibria with no coordination failure exist for high discount factors. For close enough to one, this ( ) -
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guarantees that the game admits a Markov perfect equilibrium where players exit at the action phase with a probability close to zero, and the outcome of the bargaining procedure is approximately efficient. Formally: 
Externalities on outside options and inefficiencies
We now provide an example to show that when players' outside options depend on the behavior of other players all Markov perfect equilibria may be inefficient. As all two-player games are efficient at the contracting stage, 9 this example involves three players. where player 1 (row) is the singleton player and player 2 (column) the two-player coalition. If the grand coalition forms, the total payoff is V = 10. All players have equal proposer probabilities and they are very patient ( close to one).
In this example, after the exit decision of any player, the dominant strategy of remaining players is to play r and they have no incentives to form any further coalitions. Hence, as soon as one player has exited, equilibrium behavior is easily characterized, and we focus on those states where all players are still present in the game. Our goal is to show that there are no efficient equilibria. We prove this result in two steps, first analyzing the subgame in which a two-player coalition has formed (state s 2 ) and then the initial contracting stage of the three-player game (state s 1 ). 9 In two-player games, the sum of continuation values at the action stage is (i) Consider state s 2 where a two-player coalition has formed. The action stage admits a unique, inefficient, equilibrium where both players employ mixed strategies. 10 The equilibrium utilities and offers are given by the solution to the nonlinear system of equations:
. This system of equations admits a unique solution (continuous in ) which converges to for all players i. At the contracting stage, by proposing to form a two-player coalition, a player will be able to obtain a payoff
Since every player is recognized to make an offer with probability 1/3, we conclude that the continuation value at the contracting stage of state s 1 ,
But this implies that, as converges to 1, in equilibrium, all players remain at the action stage of state s. If at least one of the other players exits, remaining is clearly a dominant strategy. If the two other players remain, remaining must be a best response, because for close enough to 1, . Hence, at least in two thirds of the cases (when players j or k are chosen to make the initial offer), the equilibrium of the game results in the inefficient formation of a two-player coalition. This clearly implies that the initial values of the game satisfy i < V. Example 2 is clearly robust to small perturbations in the payoff matrices. Furthermore, in the next section, we provide an economic application (market entry with synergies) giving 10 Clearly simultaneous exit cannot be a Nash equilibrium of the game, and there cannot be equilibria where one player exits and the other one randomizes between staying and exiting. If both players choose to remain, their continuation value will be 1 i and as rise to a payoff structure which is equivalent to the payoff structure of Example 2. In the absence of a complete characterization of games resulting in inefficient outcomes, we note that the example displays two crucial properties: (i) there exists an action stage where in equilibrium, the probability of exit of all players is bounded away from zero (for all ¯ );
(ii) at the initial contracting stage, players have an incentive to reach the action stage where exit occurs with positive probability.
Property (i) highlights the difference between the case of pure outside options (where there always exist an equilibrium with all players remaining for close to 1) and general games. In our example, the outside option of a player crucially depends on the behavior of the other player. By exiting alone, both players obtain positive payoffs (of 2 or 9), but the outside options become negative when both players exit simultaneously. Hence, a player may choose to exit today, because by waiting one period, she might be unable to retain the same outside option. In games with two players and two actions, it can be checked that the structure of our example (a "game of chicken'' where (e, e) gives lower payoffs than (r, r), and the sum of the maximal outside options of the two players is greater than V) is the only structure for which all equilibria are inefficient.
Property (ii) can only be satisfied if the payoff of a two-player coalition is large with respect to the value of the grand coalition. A rapid look at the equations defining equilibrium at the action stage shows that the most favorable condition for 2 2 to be high is when the outside option of the two-player coalition is high and the outside option of the singleton is low. (In our example, the outside option of the two player coalition (9) is much higher than the outside option of the singleton player (2)). In other words, the formation of a two-player coalition must result in a large increase in the value of the outside option.
Relation to the literature
We contrast our analysis with the previous results of Seidmann and Winter [20] and Perry and Reny [15] . The extensive form considered by Seidmann and Winter [20] differs from ours in two important respects. First, at the contracting phase, their game uses a fixed protocol. After any offer is accepted, the proposer is chosen according to a fixed rule, and upon rejection of an offer, the next proposer is the player who rejected the offer. Second, players are individuals rather than coalitions, and in particular, any individual player can unilaterally choose to implement the contract and force the coalition to exit. 11 In their analysis of the irreversible game, Seidmann and Winter [20] only study three-player examples, and their objective is to "demonstrate by example that [...] the game may possess solutions in which the grand coalition does not form when players are patient. Indeed, every solution may be partial'' [20, p. 807 ].
Interestingly, Seidmann and Winter [20] construct an example where all equilibria result in the formation of partial coalitions [20, Example 5, p. 809]. 12 As this example seemingly contradicts our results (that all games with pure outside options admit efficient equilibria when players become perfectly patient), we examine it in detail. [20] ). n = 3. There are two actions, e and r. Any player exiting alone receives 0. When bilateral coalitions exit, they receive v ∈ (2/3, 1) , and when three players exit, they receive V = 1.
Example 3 (Seidmann and Winter
In their example, Seidmann and Winter [20] suppose that, after a two-player coalition has formed, the next proposer is always the outsider. A simple heuristic argument shows why equilibrium must result in early exit. Following the formation of the coalition, the game is an alternating-offers bargaining game among three players, where the two members of the coalition have outside options v 1 and v 2 satisfying v 1 + v 2 = v > 2/3. If the players do not exercise their outside options, then the initial proposer (the outsider) receives a payoff greater than 1/3, and hence one of the two insiders has an incentive to take her outside option. If one of the players exercises her outside option, then she receives v i < v i and hence, should have exited immediately after the formation of the coalition.
Why do we obtain a different result in our game with random proposers? We suppose that all players have a positive probability to make an offer at every stage. Hence, following the formation of the two-player coalition, any insider has a positive probability to make the offer, and capture some of the additional surplus. However small the probability that this player proposes, there always exist a high enough discount factor for which the player prefers to wait one more period. Hence, there exists an equilibrium where the insiders do not exit, and the grand coalition is formed.
The parallel between our model and Perry and Reny [15] 's analysis is harder to draw. Perry and Reny [15] consider a game in continuous time, with no rigid sequence of contracting and action phases. Allowing players to make multiple rounds of offers before actions could indeed eliminate inefficiencies in games with externalities on outside options. In our Example 2, if players could make another offer following the formation of the twoplayer coalition, the equilibrium would result in the formation of the grand coalition. (At the contracting phase following the formation of the two-player coalition, there is in fact an equilibrium where all players make acceptable offers.) However, allowing players to make multiple rounds of offers before taking decisions would make the model closer to a game with continuous renegotiation, and decrease the role of outside options. If outside options are an important feature of the negotiations, and players cannot continuously delay their decisions, the type of externalities illustrated by Example 2 can always result in early exit.
Applications
In this Section, we develop four applications of the model to economic problems. We study the Markov perfect equilibria of the bargaining game, and we analyze the distribution of the surplus induced by the equilibria and the dynamics of coalition formation.
Multilateral bargaining with outside options
Bilateral bargaining with outside options is a problem that has been widely studied (e.g., [21, 22] ) and has been applied to a variety of economic problems (labor negotiations, marriage, contract theory, etc.). Yet little is known about its natural extension to an arbitrary number of players. We develop this extension in this section and show that the equilibrium exhibits some novel properties.
In the multilateral bargaining game with outside options there are n players who can collectively achieve a surplus V when the grand coalition forms. Each player is characterized by an outside option v i for all i = 1, . . . , n. At the action stage each player can choose between remaining or exiting. In the appendix, we obtain the following closed-form solution for the ε-R Markov perfect equilibrium as converges to one.
Proposition 5. The multilateral bargaining with outside options has the following Markov perfect equilibrium outcome:
(i) If v 1 n V , where v = max i=1,.
..,n v i is the largest outside option, the equilibrium payoffs converge to
for all i ∈ N and only the player with largest outside option opts out; the opt-out probability satisfies This equilibrium is a generalization of the equilibrium of Example 1, when players remain in the game with positive probability. It reflects the "outside options principle'': either outside options are binding and the player with the largest outside option receives her outside option, or they are not binding and the outcome of bargaining is unaffected by the outside options (see [22] ).
However, the equilibrium exhibits a novel property. The equilibrium payoff of all the players depend on the entire vector of outside options, including the smallest outside options. This result can easily be interpreted. In equilibrium, the player with the largest outside option randomizes between exiting and staying. Hence, if a player rejects the offer at the contracting stage, every player will obtain her outside option with positive probability. The equilibrium offer to any player i is thus a function of the entire vector of outside options, and is increasing in v i .
The model puts forward testable empirical predictions that could be explored in experimental studies. The model has other comparative statics implications (besides the one that player's payoff are increasing on their outside option). It also predicts that an increase in the highest outside option increases the sensitivity of a player's payoff with respect to her own outside option,
Increasing the largest outside option v, increases the probability of opting out, and the bargaining outcome becomes more sensitive to the outside options of all the players.
Contracting with externalities
Segal [19] analyzes a contracting model with externalities, in which a principal contracts with several agents. Players' utilities depend on the trades (actions) chosen by the principal and the agents he has contracted with, so that agents excluded from the contract may suffer (or benefit from) externalities. Segal [19] shows that this general structure encompasses a number of specific models, ranging from models in industrial organization (vertical contracting, exclusive dealing, network externalities, mergers to monopoly), to models in finance (debt restructuring, takeovers) or public economics (the provision of public goods and bads). Our goal here is to analyze this principal-agent problem in a dynamic setting (Segal's model is static) and explore the role of outside options, or irreversibility of trades, in the allocation of gains and the efficiency of the outcome.
Specifically, we recast Segal's principal-agent game in our model as follows. At any contracting phase, the principal proposes to form a coalition with a set S of agents. (As in [19] , we suppose that the principal has all the bargaining power, and that agents cannot contract among themselves.) Hence, coalitions necessarily include the principal. At any action phase, active agents have a no-trade decision (remain) and the coalition including the principal and all agents with whom she has contracted may also choose to trade (which is an irreversible decision).
Formally, trade among the principal and agent i is described by the action a i ∈ [0, a], where i = 1, . . . , n. Externalities among agent's actions are captured by the following utility structure. Any agent i trading with the principal receives a payoff a i (A) + (A), where A denotes aggregate trade, A = n i=1 a i . If an agent does not trade with the principal, she chooses the no-trade action a i = 0, and obtains a payoff (A). The principal's payoff is given by F (A). 13 Without loss of generality, all players no-trade payoffs are normalized to zero (i.e., F (0) = (0) = 0).
Principal agent models can be divided into two broad categories, according to the sign of the externalities that traders impose on nontraders. When coalition S trades (or exits) it chooses the trade A S that maximizes its payoff, i.e.
v(S) = max A F (A) + A (A) + |S| (A); the payoff received by agents outside coalition S when there is exit is thus v i (S) = (A S ).
Interestingly, despite the existence of externalities, the underlying game is a pure outside option game because the aggregate payoff of principal and agents who are contracting, v(S), does not depend on actions of other no-trading agents. We now characterize a Markov perfect equilibrium for converging to one. When externalities on nontraders are positive, it is easy to see that the multilateral bargaining procedure immediately reaches an efficient agreement. By offering to form the grand coalition, and offering to each agent his minimal payoff (the no-trade value), the principal can extract the entire surplus. As the principal has all the bargaining power and agents' outside options are minimized with no trade, these offers constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium. 14 When externalities on nontraders are negative, the structure of equilibrium is more complex. First notice that for all coalitions S ⊂ T , S = ∅
v(S) = F (A S ) + A S (A S ) + |S| (A S ) F (A T ) + A N (A T ) + |S| (A T ) F (A T ) + A T (A T ) + |T | (A T ) = v(T ),
where the first inequality is due to the fact that A S is the optimal trade of a coalition S, and the second inequality is due to the fact that externalities are negative (because (0) = 0, (A T ) 0). 15 Hence, when externalities are negative, the principal obtains a higher payoff in a subcoalition S than in the grand coalition and her exit option v(S) is greater than the total surplus V.
Therefore, after a coalition S is formed, it will require a positive transfer from all remaining agents to form the grand coalition. The coalition receives a transfer v(S)−V |N |−|S| per agent. 16 Note that this transfer is an average of what the remaining agents get if the coalition trades, v i (S) , and what they get if the coalition does not trade, 0 (the weights depend on the probabilities that the coalition chooses to exit or stay at the action stage).
The coalition that forms in the first step is the one that can extract the highest transfer from agents after formed,
In the appendix, we construct a Markov perfect equilibrium where the principal is able to extract a transfer v * from all agents, and the grand coalition is formed in two steps. Summarizing our findings we have: 14 Segal [19, p. 368 ] also notes that in games with positive externalities, efficient outcomes can easily be reached by having the principal make an offer conditional on unanimous acceptance. 15 The normalization, (0) = 0, implies that in games with positive (negative) externalities (A) > 0 ( (A) < 0), whenever A > 0. 16 The transfer made by each agent is the solution of v(S) + x(|N| − |S|) = V . Hence, when externalities are negative, the principal has an incentive to contract with the agents in two steps. In the first step, the principal forms a coalition which generates maximum negative external effects on the remaining players. In the second step, the principal uses his credible outside option to extract high transfers from the agents (see also [5] ). 17 On the other hand, in the positive externality case, contracting takes place in only one step. [17] analyze the formation of coalitions providing a pure public good. The leading illustration of their model is the formation of groups of countries deciding on abatement levels in international negotiations over transboundary pollution. They assume that each agent has a utility given by v = Z − c(z), where Z is the total amount of public goods provided and z the quantity produced by the agent, with c(.) strictly increasing, strictly convex and c (0) = 0. When a coalition S exits, it chooses its level of public good Z S in order to maximize
Public good provision

Ray and Vohra
We restrict our analysis to a symmetric three-player game. Suppose that every player only has access to two strategies: remaining (r), resulting in a zero contribution to the public good, and exiting (e) where she contributes her optimal level of public good. As c (0) = 0, every coalition will ultimately choose to exit and provide the public good. Hence, as converges to 1, the only relevant payoffs are the payoffs obtained by the three players when they exit as singletons (denoted a), the payoffs obtained when a two-player coalition and a singleton exit (denoted b for the two-player coalition and c for the singleton), and the total payoff V obtained by the grand coalition when it exits. Furthermore, as the optimal level of public good for coalition S is independent of the choices of the other players, and the cost function c is strictly convex, the game is strictly superadditive, i.e. b > 2a and V > b + c.
It is easy to check that the ε-R equilibria of this game result in the formation of the grand coalition. Once a two-player coalition has formed, the game becomes equivalent to an asymmetric version of Example 1, and in an ε-R equilibrium either both players remain in the game (and obtain V /2 each), or the large player randomizes between exiting and staying, and obtains her outside option b (when b V /2). Hence, either the grand coalition is formed immediately, or a two-player coalition forms, and negotiates with the remaining player to form the grand coalition. One can check that it is optimal to form the grand coalition immediately when the outside value of a partial coalition b is not too high; if this outside option is high, the grand coalition is formed in two steps, and members of the two-player coalition obtain their outside option b. Formally, we obtain the following proposition: It is instructive to contrast the result of Proposition 7 with the analysis of Ray and Vohra [17] , who use a different model of coalitional bargaining. In Ray and Vohra [17] 's model, players make offers to form coalitions according to a fixed protocol. As coalitions exit the game immediately after they are formed, exit decisions are taken sequentially. In this model, it is easy to see that the procedure may end up in an inefficient equilibrium, where some players decide to leave early, in order to free ride on the coalition formed by subsequent players. (More precisely, the first player may choose to exit, anticipating that the next two players form a coalition; this early exit decision is optimal whenever c > V /3.) In our model, by contrast, exit decisions are taken simultaneously. If a player makes an unacceptable offer at the initial stage (or rejects the offer), all players simultaneously choose whether to exit at the action phase, resulting in a value less than V /3. Hence, players cannot commit to exit and free ride on the coalitions formed by other players, and the equilibrium outcome is efficient. Finally, the dynamics of coalition formation reported in Proposition 7 is reminiscent of Seidmann and Winter [20] 's results in games without externalities. Seidmann and Winter [20] show that non-emptiness of the core is a necessary condition for the grand coalition to form immediately. If we interpret b as the value of a two-player coalition, non-emptiness of the core is equivalent to b 2V /3. Hence, as in [20] , but within a different model of coalitional bargaining, we observe that the grand coalition forms immediately when the worth of intermediate coalitions is small, and form gradually when the worth of intermediate coalitions becomes large.
Market entry with synergies
Suppose that three symmetric firms contemplate entering a market with fixed entry costs. By making a prior agreement, firms can benefit from synergies which will reduce their entry cost. Individual firms face an entry cost F, a coalition of two firms faces an entry cost G, with G < F and the entry cost of the coalition of three firms is normalized to zero. If a single firm enters the market, it obtains a gross monopoly profit 1 > F; if two or three firms enter the market simultaneously, price competition drives profits down to zero for all the firms which have entered the market. Obviously, the Pareto efficient outcome is for the grand coalition to form and enter the market. We analyze this model by assuming that coalitions choose between two strategies staying out of the market (r) and entering the market (e). Clearly, once one firm has entered the market, the other firms should abstain from entering. Hence, as converges to 1, the payoff matrices of the game played at the action phases converge to:
where player 1 chooses rows, player 2 chooses columns, and player 3 chooses matrices, and denotes the continuation value of the game at the initial contracting phase. If two players form a coalition, the payoff matrices are given by
where player 1 is the singleton player and player 2 the two-player coalition and 1 and 2 denote the continuation value at the contracting phase of the two players.
As long as 1 > F + G, it is easy to see that the two-player game played after a twoplayer coalition has formed is equivalent to the two-player game of Example 2, and the only equilibrium at the action phase involves both players employing completely mixed strategies. Now assume that there is a large different between the fixed costs of single firms and of coalitions of two firms (F > 4/5 and G < 1/5). In that case, the threeplayer symmetric game becomes equivalent to the game of Example 2. In the appendix, we show that the Markov perfect equilibrium of the game results in the inefficient formation of a two-player coalition, which exits the game with positive probability at the action phase.
Proposition 8. In the three-player model of market entry with synergies, as converges to 1, the Markov perfect equilibria of the game lead to the formation of a two-player coalition in the initial contracting stage, and firms inefficiently exit the game with positive probability at the action phase.
Proposition 8 shows that inefficient outcomes arise not only in numerical examples, but also in significant economic models. Inefficiencies may also obtain in a larger class of models in Industrial Organization where firms decide whether to invest in a project and benefit from synergies by forming coalitions. A typical example of those situations are research joint ventures (RJV) which have been analyzed, among others, in [4, 9] . If spillovers in R&D are low, R&D decisions are strategic substitutes and partial RJVs create significant value because they impose negative externalities on non-participants. Our results suggest that these two ingredients combined may lead to the formation of inefficient partial RJVs. On the other hand, if there are significant R&D spillovers then R&D decisions are strategic complements, and we expect the formation of a comprehensive RJV. 
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Conclusion
This paper proposes a coalitional bargaining model in which coalitions strategically interact and endogenously choose whether or not to exit. This formulation is general enough to study the formation of coalitions and the distribution of gains from cooperation in a wide variety of economic models with externalities and outside options. We show that when outside options are independent of the actions of other players, there exists Markov perfect equilibria (the class of MPE without coordination failures) which converge to efficient outcomes when the players become perfectly patient. On the other hand, in games with general outside options, all equilibria may be inefficient.
These results highlight the difference between our model and previous models of coalitional bargaining. In a setting with externalities, Ray and Vohra [16] show that when players cannot renegotiate, the outcome of coalition formation is typically inefficient, as players have an incentive to leave the game before extracting all the surplus. On the contrary, Gomes [6] establishes that when renegotiation occurs and players cannot choose to exit, the outcome is always efficient. Our study identifies a new type of friction-externalities on players' endogenous outside options-that may lead to bargaining inefficiencies.
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The continuation value at the contracting stage is given by
where q i (s) is the probability that coalition i makes an offer at state s and 1 is the indicator function.
We define a correspondence F : × × 1 × 2 →→ × × 1 × 2 whose fixed points are the MPE. is the set of continuation values = ( i (s)), which are bounded below by min{v i (a): for all states s and action profiles a}. Furthermore, the sum i∈N (s) i (s) is bounded above by V so is a closed, convex interval of a finite-dimensional Euclidean space. Let 1 be the set of proposers' strategies 1 at the contracting stage. Omitting the transfers (which are defined as the value of the coalition at the next action phase), 1 i (s) is a probability distribution over the finite set {S ⊂ N (s) : i ∈ S}. Let 2 be the set of strategies 2 at the action stage. For any state s and any coalition i ∈ N (s), 2 i (s) is a probability distribution over the finite set A i (s). Both 1 and 2 are thus convex and compact subsets of a finite-dimensional Euclidean space.
The correspondence F is defined as follows.
where supp denotes the support of a probability distribution, and where, for any 2 ∈ 2 ,
According to Proposition 1, the fixed points of F are MPE. To show that F has a fixed point we apply the Kakutani fixed point theorem. We have already noted that Z = × × Let s be a state where no coalitions have opted out and i ∈ N (s) a coalition for which the constraint is binding,
Let K be the minimum aggregate efficiency loss when one coalition opts out. By assumption, K > 0. Since coalition i opts out with probability (1−ε), and, once i opts out, the aggregate payoff is v N (a k ) V − K, for all future action profiles a k ,
We denote sums i∈N (s) v i (a) by v N (a) and i∈N (s) i (s) by N (s)).
We now estimate the lowest payoff that coalition i can obtain in the ε-constrained game. She can guarantee for herself at least v i by opting out, but in the ε-constrained game she can only opt with probability at most equal to 1 − ε. The strategy of opting out of the game with probability 1 − ε, and choosing a i such that v i = min a i ∈R i min a −i ∈A −i v i (a i , a −i ) with probability ε at every action stage, and of not making any offers and rejecting any offers made at every contracting stage, yields coalition i at least (at either the action or contracting phases)
which converges to v i when converges to 1. This formula comes from the evaluation of
at t = 0 with probability (1 − ε) the value is equal to v i and with probability ε the flow at t = 0 is (1 − )v i and the continuation value is i . So
is the value associated with an MPE of the constrained games, and i is the lowest payoff that coalition i can obtain deviating to the ε-R strategy described above, we have
In addition, 
where ε N (s)−1 is the probability that all remaining N (s)\i coalitions choose reversible actions. Combining our findings so far, we get
which is in contradiction with inequality (1).
Proof of Proposition 3.
We prove that as converges to one, all ε-R MPE converge to a Pareto efficient outcome. Assume by contradiction that there is a state s for which the statement is false. (In case there are multiple states for which the statement is false, choose one with the smallest number of active players.) Then there is a subsequence k converging to one satisfying 
which implies that
It is clear that if the probability of early exit did not converge to zero, then the MPE could not converge to the Pareto efficient outcome. Moreover, since the probability of early exit converges to zero, then the equilibrium payoffs at both stages converge to the same value.
Proof of Proposition 4. The structure of the proof is similar to the structure of the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3 and we only outline the steps that are different.
For all i, there exist v i such that max e i ,a −i |v i (e i , a
The same argument as in the proof of Proposition 2 shows that i v i − /2, 
Combining the results, we get
which is greater than v i + /2 for small enough, resulting in a contradiction.
To show that the equilibrium is approximately efficient, an adaptation of the proof of Proposition 3 shows that equilibrium payoffs satisfy
for k large enough and small enough. Hence, at the action phase, no player wants to opt out, and at the contracting phase, all players want to form some coalition. This implies that the equilibrium is approximately efficient.
Proof of Proposition 5.
We construct the equilibrium. At any state s where some players have opted out, the equilibrium strategy is for all active players to opt out. At any state s where no player has opted out, let S 1 , . . . , S m be the m active coalitions (indexed by j), and let S 1 be the coalition with the highest outside option (and suppose that there is a single coalition with the highest outside option).
We propose the following strategies. At the contracting stage, every player proposes to form the grand coalition, and to offer x j to other coalitions, resulting in expected equilibrium payoffs j . At the action stage, player S 1 opts out of the game with probability and the other players continue to negotiate. Let v N = i v i . The variables (s). x i (s) and i (s) are defined by the following equations:
If
We now show that this strategy profile forms a Markov perfect equilibrium. 
Combining the last two equations, 
and it is straightforward to verify that the unique solution of the system of equations is given by the formula in the description of the strategy profile. It remains to verify that no player wants to deviate by forming a subcoalition at the contracting stage. Consider a deviation by which some of the active players form a subcoalition S ⊂ N, and let j be the continuation value of players following the deviation. If v S v 1 then the payoff of coalition S converges to S = v S for large enough. Now v S < S since i v i with strict inequality for at least one i ∈ S. Hence, the deviation is not profitable.
If two players form a coalition, the payoff matrices are given by r e r ( 1 , 2 ) (c, b)  e (c, b) (c, b) where player 1 is the singleton player and player 2 the two-player coalition and 1 and 2 denote the continuation value at the contracting phase of the two players.
Once the two-player coalition has formed, the two-player game corresponds to an asymmetric version of Example 1, and as V > c + b, we can easily characterize the ε-R equilibria for converging to 1. If V /2 > max{c, b}, the game admits a unique ε-R equilibrium where both players remain and 1 = 2 = V /2. If V /2 max{c, b}, the game admits a unique ε-R equilibrium where the player with the largest option randomizes between staying and exiting, and the player with the lowest outside option remains in the game. The probability that the player with the largest option remains in the game converges to 1 as converges to 1. Supposing (without loss of generality) that c b, the payoffs converge to 1 = c, 2 = V − c > b.
We now consider the symmetric ε-R equilibria of the game at the initial phase, where the three players are singletons. Consider first the action stage. If V /3 > c, there exists an equilibrium where all players remain and = V /3. If V /3 < c, the symmetric ε-R equilibrium involves all players choosing a common probability of remaining in the game, where satisfies:
Notice that, in both cases, the continuation value of players at the action stage satisfy 2 V /3. Now, consider the initial contracting stage. Suppose first that b 2V /3. In that case, we claim that the grand coalition is formed immediately. By forming a two player coalition, the proposer gets at most: b − 2 whereas she would get V − 2 2 if she proposed to form the grand coalition immediately. As b 2V /3 and 2 V /3, b − x V − 2x. If now b > 2V /3, we claim that the coalition is formed in two steps. As b > 2V /3, c < V /3 and hence 2 = V /3. But then, V − 2 2 = V /3 < b − 2 , and at the initial contracting stage, the proposer has an incentive to form a two-player coalition.
Proof of Proposition 8. Consider the action stage after two players have formed a coalition. The only equilibrium of the game is a completely mixed strategy profile ( 1 , 2 ) satisfying the following equations (the notations are similar to those of Example 2),
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Solving these equations we obtain 1 = 1 − t, 2 = t,
where t is a solution of f (t) = 2t 3 + (−3 − F + G)t 2 + (2F + 1)t − F = 0. Note that because F + G < 1,
so that a solution t ∈ (F, 1 − G) exists. Now consider the initial stage where no coalition has been formed. We will show that it is a weakly dominant strategy for every firm to stay. By staying, a firm obtains either if no other firm exits, or 0 if another firm exits. By exiting, the firm either gets 1 − F if no other firm enters the market, or 0 otherwise. We want to show 1 − F.
We consider only symmetric equilibria. If players propose to form the grand coalition at the contracting stage, = 1/3 and, as converges to 1 and F > 4/5, 1 − F. If players propose to form a two-player coalition with equal probability of choosing any of the two other firms, and with x the continuation value at the action stage of the initial state,
Solution (10) implies that inequality (11) is equivalent to h(t) = 2F + F t + 2t 2 − 4t 0.
This inequality holds for all F 4/5 because the quadratic expression h(.) satisfies h(F ) = F (3F − 2) > 0 and h (F ) = 5F − 4 0. Finally, we check that it is an optimal strategy for a firm to form a coalition with one of the two other firms at the initial contracting stage. By forming the grand coalition, each firm obtains a payoff 1 − 2 . By forming a coalition of size 2 it obtains x 2 − . Hence, we need to establish that
which is equivalent to g(t) = 8t 2 − (5F + 7) t + 5F 0. This inequality holds for all F ∈ (2/3, 1) because the quadratic expression g(.) satisfies g(F ) = F (3F − 2) > 0 and g (F ) = F (16 − 5F ) > 0.
